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1Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and bolts
Payments for environmental services (PES) are part of a new and more direct conservation 
paradigm, explicitly recognizing the need to bridge the interests of landowners and outsiders. 
Eloquent theoretical assessments have praised the absolute advantages of PES over traditional 
conservation approaches. Some pilot PES exist in the tropics, but many fi eld practitioners and 
prospective service buyers and sellers remain skeptical about the concept. This paper aims to help 
demystify PES for non-economists, starting with a simple and coherent defi nition of the term. It 
then provides practical ‘how-to’ hints for PES design. It considers the likely niche for PES in the 
portfolio of conservation approaches. This assessment is based on a literature review, combined 
with fi eld observations from research in Latin America and Asia. It concludes that service users 
will continue to drive PES, but their willingness to pay will only rise if schemes can demonstrate 
clear additionality vis-à-vis carefully established baselines, if trust-building processes with 
service providers are sustained, and PES recipients’ livelihood dynamics is better understood. 
PES best suits intermediate and/or projected threat scenarios, often in marginal lands with 
moderate conservation opportunity costs. People facing credible but medium-sized environmental 
degradation are more likely to become PES recipients than those living in relative harmony with 
Nature. The choice between PES cash and in-kind payments is highly context-dependent. Poor 
PES recipients are likely to gain from participation, though their access might be constrained and 
non-participating landless poor could lose out. PES is a highly promising conservation approach 
that can benefi t buyers, sellers and improve the resource base, but it is unlikely to completely 
outstrip other conservation instruments. 
Keywords: Environmental services, rural livelihoods, conservation, economic incentives, 
stewardship, ICDPs, Bolivia, Brazil, Indonesia.
Abstract
1. Introduction
Following the Brundtland Report (Brundtland 
1987) and the Rio 1992 conference, tropical 
conservation gradually headed in a more people-
oriented direction. The trend refl ected the 
conventional wisdom that alleviating poverty 
was the only way to conserve and protect the 
environment. Integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs), and sustainable 
forest management were two major instruments 
intended to simultaneously increase incomes 
and conserve the environment (Salafsky and 
Wollenberg 2000; Pearce, Putz, and Vanclay 
2003). Yet despite scattered successes, neither 
approach has so far achieved major shifts in 
tropical land-use trends (Brandon, Redford, 
and Sanderson 1998; Sayer 1995) or silvicultural 
practices (Poore 2003; Rice 1997). Moreover, 
there are fundamental doubts about the extent 
to which it makes sense to forcibly link the 
conservation and poverty-alleviation agendas 
when the trade-offs outweigh the synergies 
(Adams et al. 2004; Wunder 2001). 
Based on these insights, much debate has 
emerged around the need for new conservation 
paradigms. The concept of payments for 
environmental services (PES) is at the centre of 
calls for more direct conservation approaches 
(Hardner and Rice 2002; Niesten and Rice 2004; 
Scherr, White, and Khare 2004; Ferraro and 
Kiss 2002). As wilderness and natural habitats 
shrink, environmental services (ES) previously 
provided free by Mother Nature are becoming 
increasingly threatened. This emerging scarcity 
makes them potentially subject to trade. The 
core idea of PES is that external ES benefi ciaries 
make direct, contractual and conditional 
payments to local landholders and users in 
return for adopting practices that secure 
ecosystem conservation and restoration. 
This contingent method differs fundamentally 
from other conservation approaches. Instead of 
presupposing win-win solutions, this approach 
explicitly recognizes hard trade-offs in 
landscapes with mounting land-use pressures, 
and seeks to reconcile confl icting interests 
through compensation. Compelling conceptual 
arguments have been made that PES schemes 
are more cost-effective than ICDPs (Ferraro 
and Simpson 2002; Simpson and Sedjo 1996). 
While PES schemes exist in some developed 
economies, they remain poorly tested in 
developing countries. There are many incipient 
PES initiatives (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; 
Pagiola, Bishop, and Landell-Mills 2002), but 
for implemented PES schemes with money 
really changing hands in a conditional way, 
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one is typically referred only to Costa Rica and 
a dozen other pioneer experiences, mostly in 
Latin America.
Four ES types currently stand out: 
1. Carbon sequestration and storage (e.g. 
a Northern electricity company paying 
farmers in the tropics for planting and 
maintaining additional trees);
2. Biodiversity protection (e.g. conservation 
donors paying local people for setting 
aside or naturally restoring areas to create 
a biological corridor); 
3. Watershed protection (e.g. downstream 
water users paying upstream farmers for 
adopting land uses that limit deforestation, 
soil erosion, fl ooding risks, etc.);
4. Landscape beauty (e.g. a tourism operator 
paying a local community not to hunt in 
a forest being used for tourists’ wildlife 
viewing). 
Sometimes several services can be provided in 
a synergetic way — and a ‘bundled’ payment 
scheme can enable several service users to 
package their payments to service providers. But 
not all services are truly threatened and scarce, 
and not all users are willing to pay. Partial 
trade-offs between services are also likely: 
for example, a fast-growing plantation that 
maximizes carbon sequestration is perhaps not 
particularly biodiversity-rich, water-enhancing 
or attractive for tourists. Environmental 
services other than those listed above could 
potentially be traded (e.g. wilderness areas 
providing pollination services to agriculture), 
but so far only the four identifi ed above exhibit 
signifi cant commercial scale. 
How have conservation and rural development 
circles received this emerging paradigm? It 
is fair to say reactions have been mixed. PES 
advocates stress that innovation is urgently 
needed because current approaches provide 
too little value for declining funding; that PES 
can provide new (especially private-sector) 
funding; and that poor communities selling 
these services can improve their livelihoods. 
Skeptics, however, fear that PES will ‘bring 
back the fences’ by decoupling conservation 
from development; that asymmetric power 
distribution means powerful conservation 
consortia may deprive communities of their 
legitimate land-development aspirations; 
and that commercial conservation may erode 
culturally rooted, not-for-profi t conservation 
values (Romero and Andrade 2004; Karsenty and 
Nasi 2004; Karsenty 2004; Vogel 2002). 
In addition, some PES opponents have vested 
interests. For a donor, money changing hands 
from a service buyer to a seller obviously 
provides fewer photo opportunities than a 
multifaceted rural development project — and 
is thus a harder sell to a home constituency 
that wants to believe in the power of point-
wise, system-changing interventions for the 
common good, rather than in the existence of 
infi nite externalities making necessary infi nite 
payments. Integrated development NGOs and 
consultants risk losing their raison d’être with 
the prospect of PES replacing ICDPs; a whole 
different skill set would be required, such as 
land-use and service monitoring, facilitating 
negotiation, and fi nancial intermediation. For 
land-use planners, PES implies recognition of 
recipients’ right to freely determine land use, 
in spite of confl icts with land-use plans that 
may exist. Not surprisingly, many see PES as a 
threat rather than an opportunity, regardless 
of its potential virtues. 
At this embryonic stage, mainstreaming PES in 
the tropics probably faces two key obstacles 
and a communication barrier. The fi rst obstacle 
is limited demand: too few service users are 
so confi dent about the mechanism that they 
are willing to pay — in some cases, because 
the link between land use and ES provision is 
insuffi ciently understood or ambiguous (see 
below). The second obstacle is poor knowledge 
about the dynamics of ES supply. Where there 
is ES demand and willingness to pay, what 
are the institutional preconditions required 
for suppliers to negotiate a PES deal? If a PES 
takes off, how will direct, contingent benefi t 
transfers work in often remote, cash-poor 
communities — both as resource-use incentives 
and in terms of local livelihood dynamics? Too 
little is known, and more hands-on experiments 
are needed. Finally, communicating the PES 
concept is a problem. Proponents often use 
an economic rationale, while skeptics draw on 
other social sciences (anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, political science). Obviously, there 
is scope to mediate between the two. 
This paper does not address the fi rst obstacle, 
‘unwillingness to pay’, which is dealt with 
elsewhere (Balmford et al. 2002; Balmford and 
Whitten 2003; James, Gaston, and Balmford 
2001; Wunder et al. 2004; Gutman 2003). 
Instead, it focuses on the second obstacle: the 
incentive and livelihood mechanics which so 
far have received comparatively less attention. 
Hopefully the paper can also better clarify the 
PES concept among conservation stakeholders, 
including its potentials and pitfalls, and lead 
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to a better understanding of which niche PES 
is likely to occupy in the conservation toolbox. 
Arguably, PES is the most promising innovation 
in conservation since Rio 1992, but it needs to 
be tried out on a much larger scale with more 
variety in applications to learn what works and 
what does not.
The PES ‘nuts and bolts’ in this paper will take 
the reader to the intermediate level of what 
questions need to be asked before designing 
a PES; it will not provide a step-by-step fi eld 
manual of how to implement a PES scheme. This 
exercise will mostly use forest-based examples, 
drawing on detailed fi eld assessments carried 
out in Bolivia and Vietnam, supplemented by 
selective experiences from Ecuador, Indonesia, 
Costa Rica and Brazil. 
The following specifi c questions are addressed. 
How is a PES scheme defi ned, and how does 
it differ from other conservation approaches 
(Section 2)? How can one evaluate to what 
extent an ES has been delivered or not (Section 
3)? Is PES likely to suit some land-use scenarios 
better than others (Section 4)? Is there a trade-
off between effi ciency and fairness (Section 5)? 
Who exactly should be paid (Section 6)? Should 
payments be in cash or in kind (Section 7)? Is PES 
useful for poverty alleviation (Section 8)? The 
paper concludes with a summary and discussion 
(Section 9). 
2. Defi nition, terms and 
key features 
2.1 Defi nition
To my knowledge, the literature so far does 
not formally defi ne PES, which contributes to 
some conceptual confusion. For our fi eld work 
in Bolivia and Vietnam, we used fi ve relatively 
simple criteria to describe the PES principle. 
A PES is:
1.  a voluntary transaction where      
2.  a well-defi ned ES (or a land-use likely to 
secure that service)      
3.  is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES 
buyer
4.  from a (minimum one) ES provider 
5.  if and only if the ES provider secures ES 
provision (conditionality). 
 
First, PES is a voluntary, negotiated framework, 
which distinguishes it from command-and-
control measures. This presupposes that 
potential ES providers have real land-use 
choices, something which in Vietnam, for 
instance, typically was not the case: payments 
here were more to be seen as in integral part 
of the predominating command-and-control 
system (Wunder, The, and Ibarra 2005). 
Secondly, what is bought needs to be well-
defined — it can be a directly measurable 
service (e.g. additional tons of carbon stored) 
or land-use caps that are likely to help providing 
that service (e.g. “forest conservation provides 
clean water”). In fact, here the word “likely” 
hides important scientific insecurities and 
popular perceptions. Especially hydrological 
services are often based on beliefs rather 
than scientifi c proof (e.g. “forest cover always 
increases water availability”) (Kaimowitz 2004). 
Also, external factors can interfere; Nature is 
not always ‘well-behaved’. For instance, even 
if forest conservation indeed increases the 
likelihood of clean local water provision, this 
increase may be subordinate if the general 
frequency of tropical storms and fl ooding is 
high, thus dominating water-quality outcomes. 
Payments that build on scientifi cally unlikely 
relationships, on likely relationship being 
unlikely to affect significantly the desired 
outcome, or on what has outright been proven 
to be a myth, might persist over a long time. 
In many cases, we lack the knowledge base to 
classify objectively which ES provision cases 
are real and which ones are ‘imaginary’. 
However, we assume that a poor underpinning 
of ES will tend to decrease PES robustness and 
sustainability: the less realistic the scientifi c 
basis of a PES scheme, the more exposed it is 
to the risk of buyers questioning its rationale 
and abandoning payments.   
In any PES, there should be resources going from 
at least one ES buyer (criterion 3) to at least 
one provider (criterion 4), though the transfer 
often occurs through an intermediary. Last 
but not least, in a PES scheme user payments 
need to be truly contingent upon the service 
being continuously provided (criterion 5). ES 
buyers thus normally monitor compliance, e.g. 
has hunting, deforestation or slash-and-burn 
agriculture really been contained in the manner 
stipulated in a given contract? In developed 
countries, supporting legal and enforcement 
apparatus can create the conditions for once-
off payments to provide  future ES fl ows, for 
instance in permanent easements (e.g. Bayon 
2004; Sokolow and Zurbrugg 2003). But in 
developing countries, this option is usually 
lacking — more so in agricultural frontier areas 
with weak governance. This feature implies 
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that in the tropics PES normally need to be 
periodic (often with an infi nite horizon) and 
tied to monitored compliance. Service buyers 
thus need to be able to withdraw from a PES 
contract if they do not get what they paid for. 
Conversely, service providers may also have 
an interest in fl exible contracts, so they can 
pull out (or alter the terms) of a PES scheme 
if changing context conditions induce them to 
do so. 
How many PES schemes with these fi ve basic 
principles can one fi nd in the tropics? In our 
assessment of two countries, Bolivia and 
Vietnam, no single scheme satisfi ed all fi ve 
criteria, although several satisfi ed more than 
one (Robertson and Wunder 2005; Wunder, 
The, and Ibarra 2005). For instance, watershed 
payments were being made, but there was no 
free land-use choice (criterion 1). The more 
precise nature of the service provided often 
remained fuzzy (criterion 2). The money often 
came from donors rather than from service 
users (criterion 3). Conversely, sometimes 
users were charged, but the money had not 
been spent so far to pay potential ES suppliers 
(criterion 4). 
However, clearly the hardest criterion to meet is 
conditionality (criterion 5): many initiatives are 
loosely monitored or not at all, payments are up 
front instead of periodic, and they are made in 
good faith rather than being truly contingent on 
monitored service provision. The business-like 
feature of contingent conservation payments 
raised some resistance in all study countries. 
In sum, while the number of tropical PES-like 
initiatives is thus considerable — (Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002) reviewed 287 such 
schemes — there are probably very few ‘true 
PES’ conforming to the theoretical concept 
developed in the literature and described in 
the simple defi nition above.      
If our fi eld search thus produced barely any 
‘true PES’ hits, is it perhaps because the 
above PES defi nition was simply too narrow? 
Historically, many schemes of reforestation and 
soil-conservation subsidies were clearly justifi ed 
in part by environmental services, even though 
the provision of the latter typically was assumed 
rather than monitored. Alternatively, one could 
choose to defi ne PES by the additive meaning of 
the terms it contains: any “payment” somehow 
intended to promote “environmental services” 
could be PES. In addition to reforestation and 
soil-conservation subsidies, things like salaries 
for local protected-area guards, wages for 
people working in conservation projects, 
and certainly all ICDPs would qualify. If, 
nevertheless, I prefer to maintain the above 
‘pure PES’ defi nition, it is out of a belief that 
these fi ve principles represent something new 
— a more direct approach that deserves to be 
tested on its own terms, before being added 
to the big pool of well-tested environmental 
spending types. Evaluating the different 
degrees of compliance with these fi ve criteria 
of specifi c cases — though sometimes a task with 
subtle distinctions — can serve as an indicator 
to what extent these cases truly represent the 
underlying PES principle. 
2.2. Terminology 
What terms have been used to describe 
this type of innovative mechanism? Box 
1 summarizes four terms describing the 
remuneration mechanism (the “P” in PES): 
“payments”, “markets”, “rewards” and 
“compensations”. As discussed in detail in 
Box 1, the choice of term implies what one 
should expect the mechanism to achieve: Is it 
the competitive interaction between multiple 
agents (“markets”), the just and equitable 
prize for services rendered (“reward”), or 
the recompense for a cost the service supplier 
has suffered (“compensation”)? This is clearly 
linked to substantive questions about what 
situations merit remuneration, to whom, in 
what ‘currency’, and how much — questions 
that will be dealt with in the remainder of this 
paper. The terms used can also trigger different 
political and ideological associations, which 
in turn can infl uence whether the mechanism 
is implemented or not (Wunder and Vargas 
2005). In the following, we adopt “payment” as 
arguably the most generic and less ideologically 
colored term, but the most appropriate choice 
of label will be case-specifi c. 
The “E” in PES has also been subject to 
discussion: does it stand for “environmental” 
or “ecosystem” services? We use the former, 
assuming a separable nature of different 
services. The latter probably has a more 
integral interpretation, implying that multiples 
services cannot always be broken up into 
additive components (Scherr, Khare, and White 
2004). However, the substantive difference for 
our purposes is minimal. 
Finally, the “S” is probably the least controversial 
part, given the consensus that we are discussing 
“services” in the sense of non-material, non-
extractive benefi ts from Nature. One factor 
of doubt can be how to account for certifi ed 
‘green’ products that are being produced 
jointly with an environmental service. In some 
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Box 1. Terms used for the remuneration of environmental 
services 
1. ‘Payments for ES’ — chosen here as the most generic term. 
However, it has a clear monetary association, which can raise 
ideological resistance (Wunder and Vargas 2005) and can be 
locally seen as confl icting with the option of in-kind payments 
(Section 7). 
2. ‘Markets for ES’ — another widely used term, e.g. by the 
Katoomba Group and IIED. The notion is not only of a prime 
role for economic incentives, but also multiple actors, choices, 
and competition to some degree. Such markets do exist in 
some developed countries, but in developing countries they 
seem remote. Market mechanisms face general restrictions in 
developing countries, but in addition, the localized nature of eco-
services often limits competition on the supply side, sometimes 
creating de facto monopolies. For instance, urban water users 
cannot just choose different upstream neighbors, or a private 
nature reserve protecting a targeted endemic species cannot be 
simply substituted by another area. Single-buyer, or ‘monopsonic’ 
schemes are also quite common, such as water companies, 
breweries, electricity fi rms, or tourism operators. Many schemes 
are thus bilateral agreements between one buyer and one seller 
— but not ‘markets’. Markets have some desirable features in 
terms of society’s resource allocation, so they are desirable 
long-term goals in some cases. But when the transaction costs 
of schemes are high, as with watershed protection, striving for 
multiple buyers and sellers might not be attractive. Our research 
in Bolivia, Vietnam and elsewhere showed that markets can 
come to be ideologically equated with neoliberalism, creating a 
political alienation  detrimental to promoting PES (Wunder and 
Vargas 2005). 
3. ‘Rewards for ES’ — a terminology with an overtone of 
entitlement and justice for service providers being secured 
through a transaction: everybody who delivers a benefi t should 
also be ‘rewarded’. This label has, for instance, been used by 
the RUPES program in Asia (“Rewarding the Upland Poor for 
Environmental Services”) (van Noordwijk, Chandler, and Tomich 
2004).  However, this general connotation runs the danger of 
raising excessive expectations, since services that are neither 
highly valuable and/or not threatened are unlikely to fi nd buyers 
(Section 5). 
4. ‘Compensations for ES’— has been used in a comparative 
framework (Rosa, Kandel, and Dimas 2003). It refers appropriately 
to a direct or opportunity cost on behalf of the service supplier, 
which creates a moral justifi cation and a societal rationality for 
paying. However, where ‘reward’ implies that everybody who 
delivers should be paid, ‘compensation’ restricts the scope to 
those who bear some costs — those who bear no costs do not 
need to be ‘compensated’. The term could be misleading when 
providers who suffer costs look not only for recompense, but also 
for a ‘providers surplus’ — gains from the transaction that exceed 
their costs and thus make them better off. In a strict sense, cost 
compensation alone would barely have any poverty-alleviation 
impact on PES recipients.    
Local inhabitant from Zancudo working as a boatman in a 
tourism operation. The Zancudo community received an 
in-kind compensation from the Transturi company for not 
hunting in a prime tourism visitation zone in the Imuya 
area, Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve, Northern Amazon region 
of Ecuador (photo by Sven Wunder). 
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global assessments of the total value of ES 
transactions, the value of these products is 
fully included (Scherr, Khare, and White 2004). 
It might be more appropriate here to count 
exclusively the value of the green premium, 
i.e. only the value difference between the 
ecologically and the conventionally produced 
good can genuinely be attributed to the ES.         
2.3. Key features
What features distinguish PES from other 
conservation approaches? PES has already been 
compared with ICDPs in the literature, but a 
broader evaluation is desirable, including a 
comparison with other conservation instruments. 
Figure 1 ranks a set of conservation approaches 
according to two criteria: fi rst, the degree 
to which they rely on economic incentives; 
second, the extent to which conservation is 
targeted directly rather than integrated into 
other development approaches. Note that 
the approaches as described are not mutually 
exclusive; they could be combined in different 
conservation strategies. 
Command-and-control regulations (including 
the creation of strictly protected areas) aim 
rather directly at protecting the resource, 
without using economic incentives — unless 
corruption turns regulations into de facto 
unoffi cial ‘taxes’. They are thus located in the 
extreme South-Eastern corner of the diagram 
and stand in stark contrast with the voluntary, 
fl exible character of PES. However, PES can 
coexist with or even enhance command-and-
control measures, as in the case of the Kyoto 
Protocol preconditioning carbon mitigation 
markets. Sustainable forest management (SFM) 
and similar resource-use improvements also 
directly pursue conservation by infl uencing 
production and extraction processes. Technical 
modifications are the main instrument, 
although economic incentives and development 
mechanisms also can play a role.       
In the South-Western cluster, ICDPs are by 
their very nature the opposite of direct.  They 
are non-contingent and explicitly integrate 
conservation and development concerns, 
looking for ‘conservation by distraction’ and 
‘less poverty — less degradation’ effects. Their 
holistic efforts include building local institutional 
capacity, generating benefi ts to ‘buy’ local 
goodwill towards conservation and infl uencing 
Figure 1. Comparing PES to other conservation approaches
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government policies. Economic incentives in 
ICDPs play a variable role. Unlike PES, ICDPs 
require investments in alternative production 
forms. They are ‘projects’ or ‘programs’, often 
surrounded by mutual expectations of holistic 
(sometimes: paternalistic) interventions. In 
contrast, PES are designed as ‘transactions’ that 
may be sensitive towards local development 
dynamics, but without pretending to hold 
community hands — it is all about selling and 
buying a service to achieve a more rational land 
use. Yet, one could also imagine some hybrid 
forms, such as integrated projects that are 
fi nanced in a contingent way (Section 9). 
In a cluster adjacent to ICDPs, we have “social 
markets” (Heyman and Ariely 2004). These 
comprise systems of reciprocity and exchanging 
favors at different social scales. By defi nition, 
these systems are non-monetary — and critics 
argue that introducing PES project tends to 
jeopardize them (Section 6). Social markets 
are often traditional systems that have 
evolved locally over time. Points of leverage 
for conservation include moral persuasion, 
social pressure, or promised favors — all factors 
closely linked to integrated social systems and 
development processes, rather than to direct 
conservation.           
Obviously, PES belong to the family of approaches 
making pronounced use of economic incentives 
(Northern cluster) — in fact, incentives are 
at the very core of PES. In that respect, PES 
resemble environmentally motivated taxes and 
subsidies. But the PES approach of ‘purchasing 
conservation’ in a contingent way is more 
direct than most taxes and subsidies which 
aim more at changes in broader production 
and resource-use patterns. Ecological price 
premiums linked to product certifi cation can 
be seen as overlapping with PES (see below, 
this section). The ‘ecological VAT’ program 
practiced in several Brazilian federal states 
is another border case between PES and fi scal 
environmental instruments: tax transfers being 
made from federal states to municipalities, 
which are rewarded for the size and quality 
of conservation areas (May et al. 2002; Grieg-
Gran 2000).  
Land acquisitions for conservation and 
similar measures such as buying out logging 
concessionaires are one-off solutions aimed 
at eliminating environmentally problematic 
actors. PES instead try to make deals to work 
with these actors. PES normally do not involve 
changes in land tenure. PES might thus be 
cheaper and more adaptive, local people need 
not be expelled, and the conservation buyer 
does not need to worry about enforcing land 
tenure. Conversely, setting up and running a 
PES scheme could over time require higher 
transaction costs (negotiation, monitoring, 
etc.) than once-and-for-all land purchases, 
and there is always a risk that the landowner 
cancels or violates the PES deal. Notably, 
land purchases are fully direct; they have no 
posterior integrated conservation-development 
dimension. In turn, to the extent that receipts 
from PES change local livelihood dynamics 
through income, consumption, labor and 
land markets, this can either strengthen or 
weaken conservation — be it by affecting the 
sustainability of the PES deal itself or through 
unexpected environmental side effects. These 
indirect feedback loops triggered by the 
development dynamics of PES are sometimes 
forgotten by those who see the PES approach 
purely as ‘direct conservation’.     
2.4 Different PES types
PES schemes thus clearly distinguish themselves 
from other conservation tools, but internally 
they are also a quite diverse family. In the 
following, three distinctions will be made: 
area- vs. product-based schemes, public vs. 
private schemes, and use-restricting vs. asset-
building schemes. 
First, PES schemes differ in the vehicles 
used to achieve conservation or restoration 
effects. The most common type is area-based 
schemes, where contracts stipulate land- and/
or resource-use caps for a pre-agreed number 
of land units. Examples are conservation 
concessions (Niesten, Ratay, and Rice 2004; 
Hardner and Rice 2002), easements, protected 
catchments, or forest-carbon plantations (Smith 
and Scherr 2002). Second most common are 
product-based schemes, where consumers 
pay a ‘green premium’ on top of the market 
price for a production scheme that is certifi ed 
to be environmentally friendly, especially 
vis-à-vis biodiversity (Pagiola and Ruthenberg 
2002). The premium could be for a product 
meticulously linked to the use or non-use values 
of pristine habitat (e.g. ecotourism, extractive 
jungle rubber), for agro-ecological production 
modes preserving relatively high ES levels (e.g. 
shade-grown coffee, organic farming) or for 
ES confl ictive production methods using best 
practice to minimize negative environmental 
impacts (e.g. certified timber, proposed 
certifi cation of soy and cattle producers in 
Brazil).
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compensate the direct costs of establishing ES, 
often through investments within agricultural 
systems (Pagiola et al. 2004). Whether PES is an 
economic rent for basically “doing nothing”, or 
at least in part a reward for actively improving 
ES, has some implications for rural employment 
(Section 8).  
                
3. How to evaluate PES 
effi ciency?
If you go to the market and buy a fi sh to cook 
for lunch, it may eventually taste better or 
worse than expected — but basically you know 
in advance what you buy. If you buy an ES, 
whether you get what you paid for is much 
less self-evident. Since the ES is provided 
over time, you always need to consider what 
would hypothetically happen without your 
PES scheme, i.e. you need to construct some 
counterfactual ES baselines. The fi rst and prime 
question to ask is whether the PES scheme has a 
suffi ciently large, additional effect vis-à-vis that 
baseline: Does it really make a difference? The 
additionality question has been much debated 
for forestry’s status in the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Only 
reforestation and afforestation are currently 
accepted as truly additional and thus eligible 
for carbon credits, while protecting forests 
that would disappear in a no-PES baseline is 
not. Figure 2 illustrates three fundamental 
baseline scenarios.   
Current CDM rules are an example of a static 
baseline where (a): forest carbon stocks are 
assumed to remain constant vis-à-vis a laissez-
faire historical scenario. The difference is 
then attributed to specifi c interventions that 
qualify for carbon credits. Critics argue that 
in many tropical countries deforestation is 
an integral part of development, implicitly 
adopting a dynamic, declining baseline (b). 
A halt or even slow-down in deforestation 
(‘avoided deforestation’) would then qualify 
for additionality and carbon credits. However, 
regions or countries in advanced stages of their 
‘forest transition’ process also regain forest 
cover as a result of land-saving and forest-
valuing development features, even without 
specific interventions. An example of this 
improving baseline (c) is Costa Rica, where a 
historical turnaround of deforestation started in 
the early 1990s (between the 1987 and 1996/97 
forest assessments), i.e. before the PES system 
was implemented from 1996 onwards. 
Second, PES also differ according to who the 
buyers are. On the one hand, in public schemes 
(e.g. in Costa Rica, Mexico, China), the state 
acts on behalf of ES buyers by collecting taxes 
and grants and paying alleged ES providers. 
On the other hand, private schemes are more 
locally focused (e.g. watershed schemes in 
Pimampiro-Ecuador, Valle del Cauca-Colombia, 
Santa Rosa-Bolivia, and basically all carbon 
schemes), and buyers pay directly. Public 
schemes are generally larger in scope and 
have the state providing legitimacy, which 
many private schemes struggle hard for. On 
the downside, public schemes can become 
overloaded with side objectives catering to 
voters rather than supplying ecological services 
proper, they are less fl exible vis-à-vis targeting 
of strategic ES sellers, and they tend to be less 
effi cient in securing additional ES provision 
(Section 3). 
Finally, “use-restricting” PES schemes reward 
providers for conservation (including natural 
regeneration) for capping resource extraction 
and land development; or for fully setting aside 
areas, such as for protected habitat. Here, 
landowners are paid for their conservation-
opportunity costs, plus possibly for active 
protection efforts against external threats 
(Hardner and Rice 2002). In contrast, in “asset-
building” schemes PES aim to restore an area’s 
ES, for example (re)planting trees in a treeless, 
degraded landscape. Conservation-opportunity 
and protection costs aside, PES may here also 
Cloud forest being protected by the watershed PES scheme in Pimampiro, 
Northern Ecuador (photo by Sven Wunder). 
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This shows that the choice of baseline is 
tremendously important for PES effi ciency. For 
instance, the Costa Rican PES system builds on 
static baselines, but if in reality forest cover 
would increase even without PES, it means 
the system is likely to pay for reforestation or 
conservation that would have happened anyhow 
— a suspicion that seems substantiated by case 
studies of PES-receiving forest owners with 
holiday cottages who would be unlikely to clear 
or degrade their forest (Miranda, Porras, and 
Moreno 2003). Conversely, current CDM rules 
bypass important opportunities to slow down 
forest loss through economic incentives, due to 
the use of a rigid static baseline. Adopting the 
wrong baseline can thus lower PES effi ciency, 
or, in the worst case, waste all the money 
spent: if no de facto change in behavior is 
achieved, no additional environmental services 
will be produced. 
Two other PES effi ciency concepts are relevant 
whenever the intrinsic scope of the ES exceeds 
in time or space the scope of the specific 
PES intervention. This is highly relevant for 
carbon sequestration, which is a global, long-
term service enhanced through a series of 
interventions specifi c in time and space. If 
a carbon PES scheme fi nances reforestation 
in a certain area, but this directly causes 
deforestation pressures in a neighboring area, 
then the PES scheme had a high leakage: 
it achieved high additionality only for the 
project area, but not for the broader, global 
goal. If after the scheme’s termination all the 
reforested trees are cut down immediately 
for fi rewood, the scheme’s permanence would 
be lower than if the trees were left standing. 
Leakage and permanence are also relevant 
concepts for watershed, landscape aesthetics, 
and biodiversity goals, depending on how 
focused these goals are in time and space, 
compared with the scope of the specifi c PES 
interventions. 
Figure 2. Three different PES baselines
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Many practical issues must be considered when 
deciding how to fi x a baseline and evaluate 
additionality. Combining implementation with 
research and systematic data collection would 
be particularly suitable in this case, as happened 
with the RISEMP project in Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua (Pagiola et al. 2004). If one just 
observes outcomes in areas with performance 
payments, one cannot discern the PES impact 
separate from omitted variables such as 
recipient’s location, schooling, conservation 
attitudes, etc. Randomizing the payment 
could help control for this bias, for example 
randomly selecting from a pool of households 
potentially eligible for PES (R.Godoy, pers.
e-comm., 7 April 2005). In the RISEMP project, 
groups were designed to control not only for 
whether PES payments were made, but also 
whether technical assistance accompanied the 
payment (J.Gobbi, pers.comm., Turrialba, 9 
February 2005).
                    
4. Using PES for which 
land-use scenarios?
In interpreting the emerging theoretical 
literature advocating PES schemes (Ferraro and 
Kiss 2002; Ferraro and Simpson 2002; Ferraro 
2001), one might be tempted to believe PES has 
an absolute advantage over other approaches, 
specifi cally ICDPs. But as mentioned above, third 
instruments may also be available, and their 
conservation-effi ciency ranking may be highly 
context-specifi c. Conservation’s opportunity 
cost, i.e. the returns to alternative land uses, 
are one discriminating factor determining 
where PES is applicable. Figure 3 provides a 
numerical example of land-use profi tability 
from Paragominas County in the Brazilian 
Amazon, which we can use for discussion.
Let us for the sake of simplicity assume 
different ES buyers had jointly determined 
that managed timber production would be the 
most desirable land-use option in Paragominas, 
maximizing different ES while providing a 
minimum productive income to land users. 
They are now pooling resources for a bundled 
PES scheme offering land-use incentives to 
shift to managed timber production. Compared 
to the net land-use profits of US$28/ha/yr 
from managed timber (horizontal line in Figure 
3), some activities have higher, others lower 
economic returns. For which ones would a PES-
led substitution strategy likely work? 
For activities with lower returns already 
(unmanaged timber, unimproved cattle 
ranching), a PES subsidy for managed timber 
production is unlikely to matter. Land users 
already would have changed to this higher-
yield activity without PES, but are probably 
constrained by other factors (access to credits, 
Figure 3. Profi tability of land uses compared. Paragominas county (Brazil)
Source: Almeida and Uhl (1995); Margulis (2003)
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technology, infrastructure, know-how, etc.) 
which are not directly related to recurrent 
land-use profi tability.
At the other end of the spectrum, perennial 
crop cultivators receive US$402/ha/yr - a 
per-hectare economic return no less than 28 
times higher than managed timber. Shifting 
them from perennials to timber production 
would require an astronomical subsidy, likely 
to by far exceed potential conservation funding 
and the economic value of the incremental 
ES gained. However, for activities marginally 
more profi table than the desired land use (i.e. 
improved ranching and annual crops in the 
‘feasibility rectangle’ in Figure 3), a PES subsidy 
could effectively alter breakeven points and 
induce the desired shift towards sustainable 
forestry. 
By implication, a PES system is likely to be most 
cost-effective in the middle range of activities 
marginally more profi table than the desired land 
use. For less profi table activities, PES is likely to 
be irrelevant; for substantially more profi table 
activities, fi nite funding tends to fall short of 
the compensation needed.                       
Obviously, there are some caveats in using this 
example to represent the complex real world. 
Producers might not only look at average annual 
profi ts, but also at other factors such as risk, 
price fl uctuations, expected future returns, 
legality of use, and security of land tenure. 
Where land is plentiful, like in the Amazon, 
they may also look more to returns per labor 
input or per capital unit invested, rather than 
per land unit. ES buyers aiming to protect 
existing, threatened services in use-restricting 
schemes (e.g. biodiversity set-asides) may need 
to anticipate emerging threats and future rises 
in opportunity costs — if they react only to 
changes that have already occurred, the service 
may already have been irreversibly lost (see 
next section).    
On the other hand, this simple example 
also has some robust practical lessons. For 
instance, in the nascent Brazilian PES program 
“Proambiente”, perennial crops are planned to 
be promoted, among other things by providing 
PES-subsidized credits. But as Figure 3 showed, 
in terms of average returns perennials are 
already extremely profi table, so PES-reduced 
recurrent capital costs and marginally higher 
returns are unlikely to make much difference 
for most land-use choices. Perennials may be 
more effectively promoted by reducing disease 
risks, price fl uctuations, credit constraints and 
other barriers to entry. It may well be that 
traditional integrated project approaches, 
targeted at the multiple non-income constraints 
to adopting perennials, are more suited for this 
specifi c task than PES.      
         
Contrary to common belief, it is often not 
necessary before PES establishment to do a 
full economic valuation of ecosystem services 
on the buyer side, and an economic study of 
farming system returns on the provider side. 
In principle, any price the two parties jointly 
negotiate can be ‘the right price’ — just as 
right as the price I negotiated for the fi sh in the 
market. For carbon sequestration, a referential 
market price already exists. However, some 
back-of-the-envelope calculations can certainly 
help each side to strengthen their negotiating 
positions, or even to pre-determine whether a 
PES scheme is a realistic option or not.
An example can illustrate this. In a watershed 
PES pilot scheme in Santa Rosa, in the buffer 
zone of Amboró National Park in Bolivia, a 
relatively low annual PES (in-kind value of about 
US$7/ha/yr) was offered to landowners to set 
aside forests for conservation. Opportunity 
costs varied according to slope, soil fertility 
and access, but would be up to an order of 
magnitude higher. When PES rates were so 
uncompetitive, surely nobody would join the 
conservation scheme? But some farmers did, 
mainly to cash in a rent for forests that they 
would have conserved anyway. While the 
scheme made important headway in locally 
piloting the basic PES principle, it probably gave 
little ES additionality, so far at least (Robertson 
and Wunder 2005). 
In this type of situation, a basic assessment 
of opportunity costs can help set PES rates 
competitively, and possibly target limited PES 
resources to those areas where they can really 
make a difference. As ongoing research with 
our partners in Costa Rica tentatively indicates, 
signifi cant effi ciency benefi ts may be gained 
by changing from the current fl at PES per-area 
payments to rates differentiated in space and 
tailored to the variable ES provision potentials 
and opportunity costs of different forest 
landscapes (T.Wünscher, pers.comm., Turrialba 
10 February 2005) — although eventually there 
may be major political-economy obstacles to 
implementing differentiated payments in a 
public scheme.  
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5. Effi ciency or fairness?
In conservation and rural development circles, 
many look to PES as a source of just reward 
for poor rural dwellers who take care of the 
environment and continuously ‘produce’ ES 
— until now, for free (Shilling and Osha 2003; 
Rosa, Kandel, and Dimas 2003; van Noordwijk, 
Chandler, and Tomich 2004). However, from 
an effi ciency point of view, only those who 
constitute a credible threat to ES provision 
should be paid. Let us return to the Brazilian 
Amazon for an example. 
First, the remote federal states of Amazonas 
and Amapá have recently declared large areas 
to be protected, and federal government 
representatives have also expressed hope 
that their pro-conservation policies will be 
rewarded with international PES resources. 
Yet, deforestation rates in most of these 
remote areas remain very low, indicating 
that the development frontier has still not 
reached them. Why would ES buyers want to 
pay for conserving forest that is not currently 
threatened, and thus would be conserved 
anyway (negligible additionality)? If land-use 
pressures are distant, how far-sighted should 
a PES initiative be? 
 Second, a state like Mato Grosso is at the other 
end of the spectrum, aggressively promoting 
the expansion of ranching and soy. High 
deforestation rates refl ect land-use threats and 
high conservation opportunity costs, especially 
in terms of soy beans’ high profi tability. The 
economic, biophysical and political context 
induces rapid forest conversion. There are thus 
many good reasons to intervene, but would 
even large-scale PES be suffi cient to change 
the process? Or is the system with its economic 
forces too much pre-geared to a scenario 
where forests will rapidly decline no matter 
what, constrained only by capital shortages, 
road infrastructure, time, and possibly legal 
constraints? Is there hence eventually greater 
hope for conservationists in pursuing command-
and-control measures here, such as enforcing the 
Brazilian legal restrictions mandating a minimum 
percentage of forest retained on farms?  
Third, a federal state like remote, forest-rich 
Acre constitutes an intermediate example. 
Its self-declared Governo da Floresta (Forest 
Government) has been innovative in socio-
environmental legislation and implementation, 
with a pro-active grassroots movement; the 
mix has much appealed to foreign donors. At 
the same time, emerging economic factors 
like road projects linking Acre to neighboring 
Bolivia and Peru and expanding timber and 
beef demand, are all increasing pressures on 
forests and accelerating clearance rates. Is this 
intermediate setting, with foreseeable major 
threats and rising opportunity costs, perhaps the 
most favorable scenario for PES application?  
 
Obviously, there are no easy answers — not least 
because the three states internally include a 
high variety of sub-scenarios. Biodiversity buyers 
might best keep a diversifi ed portfolio, acting on 
both current and projected threats. PES schemes 
need to strike some balance between short-run 
effi ciency and fairness, the latter infl uencing 
long-run viability. However, what seems certain 
is that neither the ‘ecologically noble savage’ 
who fully safeguards his or her environment, 
nor the impoverished farmer too poor to do 
significant ecological damage, will emerge 
on the scene as major ES sellers. They simply 
do not constitute a credible threat, so paying 
them creates zero additionality — it makes no 
difference. Is that unfair? Perhaps not, since they 
also do not suffer conservation opportunity costs 
from forgone development. The ideal ES seller 
is, if not outright environmentally nasty, then at 
least potentially about to become so. 
On the other hand, current threats are not the 
only relevant indicator — and sometimes threats 
are only unambiguously revealed when it is too 
late. Applying PES to target agents and areas 
where threat is projected to emerge could be an 
effective insurance against future degradation. 
CIFOR has adopted this logic trying to develop 
a community conservation concession scheme 
in Setulang village, East Kalimantan, Indonesia 
(Wunder et al. 2004). While most neighboring 
villages have sold out their forest to timber 
companies, Setulang has preserved fi ve thousand 
hectares of primary lowland forest, mainly to 
protect local water supply. 
However, the bids from logging companies are 
rising, and the internal village conservation 
consensus is endangered. In this situation, an 
external biodiversity payment to local people for 
not selling logging rights could help sustain the 
village consensus. It can also help them cover the 
costs of more effectively protecting the forest 
against logging companies’ external threat. PES 
probably has a high potential for achieving real 
and additional conservation gains in situations 
where decisions are still ‘on the edge’, especially 
when it is in a use-restricting scheme with ES being 
threatened by irreversible loss (e.g. biodiversity). 
Once the balance has tipped and the community 
has sold off logging rights, it is obviously too late 
for PES to have any impact.    
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6. Whom to pay?
This section will deal with three concerns in 
selecting possible PES recipients: the value-
added chain, insecure land tenure, and illegal 
resource use. The fi rst issue relates to the 
vertical distribution of opportunity costs. 
Consider the Setulang case (Wunder et al. 
2004). For a biodiversity PES to be politically 
acceptable, one needs to compensate a 
critical mass of decision makers that would 
otherwise benefit from the biodiversity-
threatening activity, logging. Figure 4 shows the 
approximate distribution of timber-extraction 
benefits, combined with the financial and 
commodity fl ows. Logs are being extracted 
from de jure state forests, the use rights of 
which are de facto claimed by different local 
communities through traditional land rights 
(adat) that in turn are generally recognized by 
the post-Suharto Indonesian state.
However, claims are overlapping between 
communities, and their negotiation power 
varies — causing their shares in total timber 
rents to diverge (right-hand bar). Yet, other 
agents such as intermediaries (fees), timber 
companies (sales value), local government 
(taxes, bribes) and probably timber consumers 
(consumer surplus) are currently getting the 
lion’s share of net profi ts, and would thus 
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Figure 4. Buying out logging rights for conservation in Indonesia
CIFOR is supporting the village of Setulang, East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia, setting up a PES scheme to 
avoid logging of the village’s lowland forest and fi nd 
fi nancial support to set it aside for conservation 
(photo by Yani Saloh). 
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have the most to lose from conserving forests. 
Should all these actors be compensated in a 
PES scheme? 
From an effi ciency point of view, one would 
want to compensate enough (not necessarily 
all) actors to form a resilient conservation 
alliance, but selecting only among those who 
have credible site-specifi c claims. Generally, 
consumers, intermediaries and timber 
companies need not be compensated, as long 
as their interests remain ‘mobile’. Unless 
they buy, rent or forcibly occupy an area, 
they cannot make site-specifi c claims. On the 
other hand, communities acting as direct local 
guardians have a vital stake, and do need to be 
compensated. Yet, if the community is too weak 
to protect its land from loggers, then a PES 
scheme has no foundation. Local government, 
recently strengthened by decentralization, 
can be a catalytic actor that may need to be 
rewarded, although there are pros and cons. 
Note that for a PES to be ‘fair’, one might want 
to compensate all losers, but in this specifi c 
case across-the-board compensation would be 
prohibitively expensive. Note also that buying 
conservation for a relatively low price, aligned 
only with local people’s opportunity costs, 
could eventually trigger losses in national 
income by forgoing large timber rents paid to 
non-local actors (Section 8). Whom exactly 
to pay is a question of negotiation, political 
feasibility (which includes perception of 
fairness), legality (particularly vis-à-vis land 
tenure) — and possibly also of ethics, since 
some actors may lose illegal revenues, corrupt 
payoffs, and iniquitous profi ts.
Second, many land users in the tropics do not 
have formal land titles, especially in agricultural 
frontier areas. Can and should these people 
receive PES? The main preoccupation for 
private ES buyers should not be the de jure 
land rights, but de facto land- and resource-
use control capacities. Informal landowners 
whose land claims are widely recognized and 
respected can be effi cient ES provider since 
they can control access; someone whose tenure 
is perceived as insecure and weak cannot, since 
external agents can occupy the land or harvest 
the resources. In disaggregating the complex 
concept of tenure rights, the ‘right to exclude’ 
layer is particularly decisive for ES providers’ 
effi ciency. The more open the access, the less 
adequate the scenario is for PES. 
 
Third, land tenure issues aside, does the legal 
status of resource uses matter for selecting 
PES recipients? Many legal caps on tropical 
land uses are weak (e.g. declared but not 
enforced ‘protection forests’), and some forest 
products (e.g. wild animals, logs, charcoal) are 
globally to a large extent illegally harvested. 
Should these resource users receive PES to 
defer their threats of illegal extraction? If so, 
would legal actors be perversely encouraged 
to drift into illegal activities, too, in order to 
qualify for PES — or just to protest against an 
unfair system? Could PES eventually come to 
endorse crime (Vogel 2002)? There is certainly a 
game-theoretical foundation for environmental 
blackmail (Mohr 1990), and perverse incentives 
have been a real concern for some PES schemes 
(Pagiola et al. 2004).   
 
Again, there is no one-size-fi t-all answer, and 
a pragmatic approach is recommended. In 
many cases, a carrot-and-stick approach is 
rational, i.e. to supplement weakly enforced 
laws with PES compensations partially covering 
compliance opportunity costs — especially when 
recent top-down protection declarations can 
be said to have been unfair vis-à-vis existing 
local land claims. Even in the well-established 
Costa Rican PES system, farmers are paid inter 
alia for not deforesting, although deforestation 
actually is illegal. 
However, since PES presuppose de facto 
free land-use choices (Section 2), they are 
normally not an adequate tool to strengthen 
existing protected areas, although there can 
be exceptions. To the degree that protected 
areas have been relatively effi cient in halting 
deforestation (Bruner et al. 2001),  squatters 
should not be paid to stop expanding further 
into national parks — unless it is bound to be a 
‘paper park’ without any command-and-control 
potential. Paying squatters could backfi re by 
‘giving away hostages’ in the struggle over 
protected land, e.g. by attracting new squatters 
looking for their ‘just reward’. Ultimately, the 
decision whether to offer carrots depends on a 
realistic assessment of how far the stick alone 
will take you.
More broadly, PES implementation should be 
preceded by an effi ciency analysis of existing 
approaches and motivations for ES provision, and 
how a PES scheme would likely affect them. Will 
payments always increase recipients’ effort? At 
least part of the psychological literature claims 
that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic 
motivation (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999), 
such as a community’s self-interest and pride in 
forest conservation. Monetary rewards could also 
debilitate pre-existing social markets (Section 2), 
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i.e. societal ties and reciprocity arrangements. 
Apparently this is especially a danger as long as 
payments remain small (Heyman and Ariely 2004). 
At worst, conservation effort in exchange for a 
low monetary PES could be lower than for ‘no 
payment’. This is noteworthy, since in most cases 
PES amounts paid have actually remained low. 
7. How to pay?
Payment methods also matter for PES effi ciency. 
A cynical ES buyer might be indifferent 
about the mode of payment, as long as the 
provider signs the contract. But the contract’s 
sustainability may eventually depend on the 
unforeseen development effect of payments 
on household incomes, changes in consumption, 
and demand for land and labor. Also, these 
changes may have environmental side-effects 
on conservation, beyond what is stipulated in 
the contract. So it is advisable to ex ante think 
about (and even experiment with) different 
payment modes, including the cash vs. non-cash 
selection and the periodicity of payment.  
Economists often think of cash payments as the 
most fl exible and thus preferable mode. Cash 
will be most appropriate when ES suppliers 
forgo cash income to comply with a PES 
contract, e.g. reducing a planned expansion in 
cash crops to conserve a forest area vital for 
watershed protection. Indeed, in this situation 
ES suppliers could hardly be expected to accept 
non-cash PES benefi ts exclusively, since cash is 
exactly what they lose from conservation. 
Many development practitioners are generally 
hesitant to advocate cash transfers to rural 
communities, since they doubt the ability of 
cash to create sustained local welfare. Cash 
may increase myopic spending (alcohol, luxury 
goods, etc.) and cause social distress. At the 
other end of the spectrum, some argue that 
regular cash transfers are more effective in 
alleviating poverty than in-kind contributions 
or development projects. For instance, in two 
recent Mozambican cash-transfer programs, 
fl ood victims and demobilized soldiers have used 
their money wisely, administrative costs were 
very low at 5-10%, and the poverty-alleviation 
impact was impressive (Hanlon 2004).
     
A PES fi eld example can illustrate the viewpoints 
ranging between these two extremes. Table 1 
sums up different attitudes from interviews 
in the Santa Rosa watershed (Bolivia) vis-à-
vis the pros and cons of receiving PES in the 
form of beehives (the current in-kind mode) 
versus cash (as hypothetical alternative) 
(Robertson and Wunder 2005). The recipients 
originally negotiated a contingent transfer of 
beehives, combined with technical assistance 
for beekeeping. As one PES-enrolled farmer 
explained, “If I receive cash, I know I will spend 
it right away. Instead, I want these payments 
to create something that lasts.” This statement 
indicates not only reluctance to receive cash, 
but also recipients’ expectations of ‘integrated’ 
(often, paternalistic) interventions: the 
mediating NGO is assumed to deliver a 
readymade, complete ‘package’ of benefi ts. 
This may well be a rational preference if 
Table 1. Perceived advantages and disadvantages of two PES payment modes in 
Santa Rosa (Santa Cruz, Bolivia), Fundación Natura. Cash and in-kind transfers 
compared.
Beehive pros/Cash cons Cash pros/In-kind cons
-  Some recipients reject money — it would 
be spent rapidly and leave no long-run 
benefi ts 
- Some recipient little skilled and interested in  
beekeeping, thus losing benefi ts
-  Paying cash “smells” more like losing
  property rights — whether that fear is 
rational or not
- Beehives are infl exible assets to sell, 
compared to animals or equipment 
-  Honey is a useful subsistence product - Beehives are infl exible assets to subdivide, 
compared to cash
-  Beekeeping includes an incentive to 
protect  forest as bee habitat 
- Extra training costs for implementing NGO
-  Demonstration effect of bees and the sweet 
taste of honey give PES implementers more 
goodwill than a corresponding cash transfer
- Extra costs for recipients to benefi t — 
beekeeping demands labor inputs
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local capacities for saving, investment and 
entrepreneurship are limited. Other recipients 
said honey was a useful subsistence product, 
and receiving beehives caused less fear over 
land expropriation than cash transfers, whether 
such fears were rational or not. 
For the NGO, the need for bee habitat provided 
an additional local incentive for conserving the 
forest. Also, the beehive ‘demonstration effect’ 
was claimed to bring more mileage than tiny 
corresponding cash payments would do. This 
is supported by psychological science claiming 
that low-value, in-kind payments can be more 
effective than low-value cash payments in 
stimulating effort, since recipients are more 
likely to view in-kind transfers as compatible 
with reciprocal exchange and “social markets” 
(Heyman and Ariely 2004).     
However, local opponents wanting cash instead 
stressed the beehives’ infl exibility as an asset, 
as well as the labor and skill requirements, 
implying that less-dedicated beekeepers would 
receive low or zero returns. The NGO training in 
beekeeping also constitutes an extra cost. Some 
recipients foreshadowed they would sell the 
next hives to those specializing in bees — thus 
creating an ‘intra-village secondary market’ 
exchanging bees for cash. Others said they 
would prefer in-kind alternatives, e.g. barbed 
wire to fence off their land and strengthen 
tenure. Unless it poses high incremental 
administrative costs, one could offer a menu of 
payment modes, even in the same village.
 
This small example shows that one is well-
advised to investigate in advance what 
mode local people favor. Their preferences 
might vary across villages, families and even 
individuals within families, so that a customized 
approach is desirable. Recipient gender aspects 
should also be monitored, and in some cases 
collective rather than individual contract may be 
preferable (Section 8). In terms of periodicity, 
it is often desirable to mimic other regular 
income fl ows with small, frequent payments 
— even if compliance monitoring is done only 
once a year. This may be particularly relevant 
if cash payments are applied, and temptations 
for rapid spending are substantial. But one has 
to fi nd out case by case what is most likely to 
increase welfare. Some recipients will prefer 
in-kind options, but cash-poor communities may 
clearly prefer cash. PES implementers should 
overcome the paternalistic prejudice that 
local people are generally unable to administer 
money going into their pockets.          
Finally, it has been suggested that PES 
agreements could include contingent transfers 
of infrastructure, such as building a school or 
a road, or giving basic resource rights to local 
people, such as  formal land tenure (Rosa, 
Kandel, and Dimas 2003; van Noordwijk, 
Chandler, and Tomich 2004). The problem here 
is that large or irreversible up-front benefi ts 
are dubious incentives for a continuous supply 
of contracted services over time. How can 
one credibly sanction non-compliance — a 
crucial concern for any contingent agreement? 
Possibly one could tie compliance to the running 
maintenance cost of infrastructure, e.g. to the 
costs of keeping a school or a road open. But 
even so that road maintenance might be taken 
over by a logging company or an agricultural 
investor promoting the exact opposite of the 
land use ES buyers had looked for. These types 
of incentives are thus generally more apt for 
ICDPs than for PES schemes. It makes extremely 
bad headlines for a conservation organization 
to come and destroy the locally built school or 
road, or to deprive people of their newly won 
land rights, just because they happened not to 
honor their side of the PES bargain. 
8. Pro-poor PES? 
At a time when overseas development assistance 
is increasingly focusing on poverty alleviation, it 
is no surprise that fads like PES are scrutinized 
for their potential to achieve this goal. Much 
hope exists that poor ES providers (e.g. remote 
upland farmers) can raise their incomes by 
receiving PES from the allegedly richer ES 
buyers (e.g. urban water users); indeed some 
donors are only interested in PES for their 
hoped-for, pro-poor effects. 
Conceptually, it is convenient to look at three 
poverty-related sub-question (Grieg-Gran et 
al 2005): 
1) Participation: what access to and ‘market 
share’ in PES schemes can poor potential 
ES providers compete for? 
2) Effects on ES sellers: To the extent poor 
providers do get access, how does PES 
participation affect their livelihood?
3) Effects on non-sellers: How does PES 
affect poor people not selling ES (non-
participating farmers, poor ES users, 
product consumers, landless laborers, 
etc.)?     
17Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and bolts
8.1 Access to PES participation
Poor farmers seeking to become service 
sellers face both explicit PES access rules and 
underlying structural constraints. Explicit PES 
access rules can favor or disfavor smallholders. 
Examining six carbon and two watershed 
projects in Latin America, Grieg-Gran et al. 
(2005) found a mixed picture. Some rules 
discriminated against smallholders, such as 
formal-tenure requirements and the exclusion 
of agroforestry and silvopasture; others, 
such as maximum farm-size and targeting of 
underdeveloped regions, were pro-poor. 
There are two major underlying structural 
constraints. First the ‘poorest of the poor’ often 
do not own or control any land, thus directly 
ruling them out as PES service providers — at 
least as long as the PES scheme is ‘area-based’. 
PES is thus by its very nature more relevant to 
‘moderately poor’ smallholders. Even those 
poor who control land often do not have 
formalized or fully secure tenure. As argued in 
Section 6, a pro-poor PES scheme could, in most 
cases, work its way around tenure informality, 
but effective land-use control is more diffi cult 
to enhance by external intervention. 
A second structural constraint is the high 
transaction costs of dealing with many 
smallholders (or land owned collectively by 
internally confl ictive communities), compared 
to only a few big landowners (Smith and 
Scherr 2002). This is exacerbated if there are 
economies of scale in service provision, e.g. 
when carbon sequestration requires a process 
of Kyoto certifi cation with elevated fi xed costs. 
Again, creative scheme design to ‘bundle’ 
smallholders, as currently experimented with 
in Costa Rica’s national PES scheme, might 
alleviate that constraint. ‘Bubble projects’ 
for carbon sequestration are a similar cost-
saving attempt to make ES commitments for an 
entire county or region, rather than individual 
landholders (ibid: 34-5). Obviously, this will 
move at least part of the transaction costs 
from the buyer to those seller institutions that 
have to make sure collective commitment is 
converted into a suffi cient degree of individual 
compliance. All these measures can thus 
probably reduce transaction costs, but hardly 
eliminate the structural constraint proper. 
Working with three ES providers will almost 
always be easier than working with three 
hundred. 
Naturally, these ‘comparative disadvantages’ 
of smallholders must be weighed against 
any corresponding advantages. In particular, 
smallholders may have significantly lower 
opportunity costs of their labor and possibly 
of their (marginal) lands (Costa and Zeller 
2003). As long as PES rates per land unit are 
low, wealthier actors with better capital and 
technology access and thus higher opportunity 
costs may not fi nd it worthwhile to compete 
with poor ES suppliers. These potential 
advantages of poor ES suppliers may or may 
not make up for their higher transaction costs. 
Achieving high smallholder participation rates 
is also often simpler for highly spatially bound 
services (e.g. watershed protection) where 
buyers have to work with whomever occupies 
the targeted space, whereas the dilemma 
Two PES recipients from Nueva America, Pimampiro, Northern Ecuador. 
Payments are made by the town’s water consumers to potect the forest 
in the headwater of the watershed (photo by Sven Wunder).  
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of transaction costs becomes more apparent 
for homogenous services with a high degree 
of spatial mobility and competition (carbon 
sequestration, in particular).
8.2. Effect on ES sellers
Once poor service suppliers have made it 
through the eye of the selection needle or 
have obtained an ES market share, how are 
they likely to fare? As explained in Section 2, 
PES contracts are voluntary agreements, so 
individual service providers can only be made 
outright worse off if they are being cheated, de 
facto forced into participation, or just surprised 
by the ex post livelihood impacts (e.g. due to 
under-estimated opportunity costs) and local-
economy derived effects (e.g. changing land or 
labor markets). 
Of these possibilities, the latter is maybe the 
most likely (see discussion below) — though 
even here PES exit or renegotiation options 
may still exist. Cases where service sellers 
are being ‘PES trapped’ into a lasting negative 
livelihood outcome could potentially occur, 
e.g. with long-term land-use deals being signed 
under asymmetric access to information. But 
so far, convincing real-world examples of ‘PES 
trap’ cases seem to be lacking in the literature. 
Not only does PES offer an additional source 
of income in often cash-poor areas with low 
diversifi cation, the cash fl ow is potentially also 
more stable than common alternative sources, 
such as cash crops with heavily fl uctuating 
output prices. At least, this is the case if 
the PES program is well-administered and 
continuously funded, so that ES buyers fully 
meet their obligations (Pagiola, Arcenas, and 
Platais 2005).  
Even if poor PES providers are likely to be better 
off, questions remain as to ‘how much’ and ‘in 
what way’ they will gain from participation. 
As in any commercial transaction, there is 
an inherent confl ict over price between ES 
buyers maximizing consumer surplus (‘biggest 
conservation bang for the buck’) and ES 
providers boosting their producer surplus (PES 
payments net of opportunity costs). ES buyers 
will often, though not always, be in a better 
negotiating position on account of being fewer 
in number, more well-informed and initiative 
seeking than ES providers. For instance, more 
opportunity-cost studies have been done than 
willingness-to-pay studies; the buyers thus 
know more about the sellers than vice versa. 
Increasing organization and information levels 
among ES providers could sometimes improve 
their negotiating position.  
Notwithstanding possible power asymmetries, 
in some cases PES come to constitute a 
noteworthy share of participants’ household 
income — at least as far as we can tell from 
all the preliminary studies that are available. 
In Costa Rica, PES payments accounted for 
more than 10% of family income in more than 
one quarter of participants (E.Ortiz, cited in 
Pagiola et al. (2005)); in Virilla PES payments 
averaged 16% of cash household incomes, but 
three-quarters of households there earned 
more than US$820 monthly and were thus far 
from poor in the fi rst place (Miranda et al. 
2003). However, in poverty-struck zones the 
situation can be quite different. In Costa Rica’s 
Oca Peninsula, a small survey found that of PES 
recipients that were under the poverty line, 
the scheme lifted half above it and became the 
primary household cash income source in 44% 
of cases (Muñoz 2004). In Pimampiro (Ecuador), 
watershed-protection payments to poor upland 
colonos made up 30% of recipient households’ 
spending on food, medicine and schooling 
(Echavarría et al. 2004). PROFAFOR carbon 
projects in the low-income, high-altitude areas 
of Ecuador, and the Huetar Norte project in a 
disadvantaged region of Costa Rica both created 
some employment in the short run and an 
important plantation asset for future incomes 
(Miranda, Porras, and Moreno 2004; Albán 
and Argüello 2004; Milne 2000). Obviously, all 
gains reported here are gross fi gures, since 
we do not know the size of opportunity costs 
(income forgone due to PES-induced land-use 
restrictions), which could be anything from zero 
to the size of the proper PES payment. Yet, at 
least for disadvantaged regions, the relative 
size of income PES contributions seems likely 
to have been quite signifi cant.             
Sometimes PES recipients gain more than just 
income from participation; non-monetary side 
benefi ts can be at least as important (Rosa, 
Kandel, and Dimas 2003). Three factors stand 
out here. First, PES participants perceive that 
PES contracts can help increase land-tenure 
security vis-à-vis neighbors or squatters by 
mapping and demarcating the land and by 
demonstrating an income-generating activity 
from it. This was found in various Latin 
American case studies by Rosa et al. (2003), 
but also in our Bolivia case (Santa Rosa) where 
forested land is highly threatened by landless 
migrants from the highlands. Second, PES 
participants tend to increase their ‘social 
capital’ by improving internal organization, e.g. 
when collective bargaining and action vis-à-vis 
the service buyers are needed (Rosa, Kandel, 
and Dimas 2003; Grieg-Gran, Porras, and 
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Wunder 2005). Some benefi ts accrue through 
PES ‘learning-by-doing’; others are provided 
in advance (e.g. formal training). This social-
capital effect is generally to the advantage of 
local people in their other business dealings 
with the outside world. Some negative social 
effects (e.g. tensions between PES participants 
and non-participants) can also occur. Finally, 
the PES program works as a strategic ‘site 
propaganda’, increasing the visibility of the 
village or community vis-à-vis both donors 
and public entities. For instance, in Bolivia we 
found that some villages involved in landscape-
beauty/ecotourism initiatives suddenly found it 
easier to attract a donor for a health clinic or 
get recognition from the municipality regarding 
their long-claimed land-tenure.
8.3. Effect on the non-ES selling poor
What happens to those impoverished people who 
are not participating in, but still are affected 
by PES? This is much harder to say, since this 
residual group is quite heterogeneous, and since 
impacts are dominated by complex secondary 
effects that occur in factor markets (land, 
labor) and in commodity markets (agricultural 
crops, forest products, etc.). It seems most 
relevant to look at three impoverished groups: 
service users, on-site landless people, and off-
site actors in the value-added chain. 
First, not all ES users are well-off agents. Poor 
tropical farmers are likely to suffer most from 
global warming since they lack the means to 
adapt their farming systems, and are thus 
particularly helped by mitigation efforts (IPCC 
2001). Urban water users in shanty towns often 
receive their drinking water for free since their 
Payments for environmental services are most effective in marginal lands where a modest pay-
ment can “tip the balance” in favor of conservation. Dry forest area in Costa Rica’s Guanacaste 
region, where pastures are abandoned and enrolled in the PES program (photo by Sven Wunder). 
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taps are not metered; hence they free-ride 
on any PES-led improvement in water quality 
or availability. Free-riding ES consumers are 
thus made better off, yet their slightly more 
privileged counterparts in the next district who 
pay for water may well be made worse off, if 
water fees are rising to fi nance PES.   
Second, in many cases the landless ‘poorest of 
the poor’ self-engage (or are being employed) 
in some of the most ES threatening activities, 
such as logging-company workers, fi rewood and 
charcoal makers, extractors over-harvesting 
NTFPs (non-timber forest products), or farm 
hands hired for clearing land and for cultivating 
converted soils. To the extent that the PES 
scheme is use restricting (Section 2), i.e. it caps 
planned forest-product extraction or agricultural 
conversion, groups involved in these activities 
will lose out in terms of employment or informal-
sector income. For instance, PES restrictions 
were found to be likely to hurt traditional herder 
and NTFP harvester groups in India (Kerr 2002). 
In the Santa Rosa case, poor farmers enrolling 
in conservation PES want to protect themselves 
from the poorest-of-the-poor migrants coming 
to the village with the clear aim to occupy 
‘idle’ land. This shows that subgroups of ‘the 
poor’ may have internally antagonistic interests 
vis-à-vis PES implementation. Conversely, if ES 
provision is asset-building, such as justifying 
planting trees in degraded landscapes with few 
productive alternatives, this can trigger a net 
expansion in rural jobs and benefi t unskilled 
rural labor, thus alleviating poverty. 
While effects thus can go both ways, in some 
cases their size can be signifi cant. For instance, 
laid-off logging and sawmill workers were the 
main reason for compensatory ICDPs being 
implemented in the Noel Kempff Mercado 
Climate Action Project in Bolivia (Asquith, 
Vargas-Ríos, and Smith 2002). If PES is locally 
lucrative, it could increase competition for 
PES-eligible land, possibly to the detriment of 
the weakest actors’ access to that land (Rosa, 
Kandel, and Dimas 2003).   
Finally, PES-induced rural changes can have 
off-site effects. For instance, the urban poor 
buying charcoal could be faced with higher 
prices if an important peri-urban, charcoal-
production area is set aside for conservation. 
Conversely, these higher prices may benefi t poor 
charcoal producers at other sites. If valuable 
timber rents end up mainly in the capital, then 
restricting timber harvests can indirectly affect 
poor people working in, say, the urban service 
sector stimulated by these rents. Cutting off raw-
material supply can have important downstream 
development impacts — which obviously should 
be compared to any ‘multiplier effects’ from 
PES fi nancial injections. No empirical studies 
on these linkages exist; in most cases one would 
expect them to be smaller than on-site effects, 
but timber rents could be a prominent exception, 
as was shown in Section 6.   
9. Conclusion and 
 perspectives
9.1. When is PES the preferable  
 conservation instrument?
 “Give a man a fi sh and he’s set for 
supper. Teach him how to fi sh and 
he’s set up for life.”
This popular proverb expresses well the appeal of 
ICDPs and other indirect approaches: removing 
the obstacles to sustainable development 
(poverty, shortages of capital, technology 
and skills) would ‘fi x the problem’ and make 
people embark on pro-conservation paths — in 
principle, forever. This message about the 
alleged synergy between development and 
environment from Brundtland and Rio 1992 was 
politically attractive, but unfortunately, in the 
conservation fi eld, the fl aws in the ‘teaching-to-
fi sh’ strategy are increasingly apparent.  
ICDPs attract two main criticisms. First, although 
you have taught the man to fi sh, he might still 
have enough time and resources to extract 
logs, shoot game, and clear forests — nothing 
per se obliges him to change his approach. 
Secondly, what does it take to teach the man 
to fi sh? If it takes one strategy paper, two 
village-development plans, three participatory 
workshops, four action researchers, a fi sh-
processing plant and an army of project staff 
and consultants… it might just be cheaper to 
buy the man a fi sh every day. This is precisely 
the justifi cation for PES — the promise of more 
effi ciency from giving the man a fi sh as a direct 
reward, if and only if he conserves. 
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of PES 
directness, various caveats remain. First, as 
an ES buyer you need a sustainable source 
of PES fi nancing, often into infi nity. Further, 
while demand may remain restricted, supply-
driven expansion of environmental services 
is unrealistic. From the provider side, any 
random upland community cannot just decide 
21Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and bolts
in a village meeting: “What are we going 
into this year, folks — watershed protection, 
biodiversity or landscape beauty”? Except for 
the geographically mobile carbon services, the 
spatially specifi c ES character will imply that 
the buyers or intermediaries will usually take 
the initiative, approaching providers because 
they realize the latter control a strategic and 
increasingly scarce environmental asset. 
Second, one has to build the initial trust or 
“social capital” for PES. The man out there 
in the wilderness may believe when you offer 
him fi sh that you in fact want his land, or 
some other PES-camoufl aged fi shy business. 
Building that trust, and setting up the rules, 
monitoring and rewards, may be cumbersome, 
take time and require an ‘honest broker’ like 
an NGO as intermediary — yet success is still 
not guaranteed. Indeed, communities may 
not accept a quid pro quo agreement when 
they are accustomed to multiple donors and 
agencies offering benefi ts for free. Decades 
of paternalistic rural development projects 
may thus create expectations that are hard 
for innovative initiatives to break, even if both 
sides might be better off. 
After all, PES can thus also involve high 
transaction costs. Certainly, there will be 
cases where outright land purchases are a more 
rational conservation strategy than the PES 
approach of buying time-bound land-use rights. 
In other scenarios, command-and-control will 
remain preferable to economic incentives. In 
yet other contexts, the ICDPs remain a better 
approach, since a ‘win-win’ switch to more 
sustainable and simultaneously profitable 
private production can actually be achieved 
through point-wise interventions — indeed an 
attractive option to the buyer, who would not 
need to go on paying forever. Perhaps a new 
generation of ‘contingent ICDPs’ will emerge. 
PES-ICDP hybrids could be short-run payments 
rewarding technological adoption, such as in 
the RISEMP project where ranchers receive 
conditional payments for two to four years, 
combined with technical assistance, in order 
to achieve lasting shifts from treeless to silvo-
pastures (Pagiola et al. 2004). In other words, 
many non-PES approaches will also remain 
highly relevant, perhaps in new, more direct 
forms. 
Conservation practitioners often feel irresistibly 
attracted to high-threat scenarios, where 
intervention seems most badly needed. Is this 
also where PES should preferably be used? 
Certainly PES makes sense only when there 
is some current or projected threat; without 
threat there is no additionality and no raison 
d’être for PES. But if high threat means high 
opportunity costs, PES will usually not be the 
answer. Often there will simply not be enough 
funding available; in PES terms, it is best to 
‘let go’ these scenarios, and possibly apply 
other tools. Conversely, if the desired land use 
is already privately more profi table than the 
non-desired one, it normally makes no sense 
to apply PES. PES is thus most useful in the 
intermediate range of positive but numerically 
small opportunity costs: degraded pastures, 
marginal croplands, forests in slow-moving 
agricultural frontiers, etc. Like other economic 
incentives, PES makes the most sense at the 
margin of profi tability, when small payments 
to landowners can tip the balance in favor of a 
desired land use. It was also hypothesized that 
scenarios with projected threats could be ripe 
for PES as a form of environmental insurance.  
9.2. How to design a PES scheme? 
If one has chosen to go the PES route, what 
hints can one give about desirable PES design? 
Apart from a few exceptions (Costa Rican 
PES, some carbon projects), most tropical 
PES initiatives are incipient, so assessing 
their conservation and livelihoods impacts 
remains somewhat premature. Conceptually, 
it is wise to distinguish between ‘true PES’ 
and the much broader family of ‘PES-like’ 
initiatives. The former are few, the latter 
many — and converting some of the latter into 
the former would seem desirable in order to 
seriously try out the PES principles, especially 
conditionality. Area- vs. product-based PES, 
and state-run vs. private schemes, also infer 
some design differences. Use-restricting vs. 
asset-building schemes have different impacts 
on rural activity levels.     
A baseline is essential for ES buyers to plan 
and later assess PES additionality, otherwise 
funding can be wasted paying for things that 
would have happened anyway. Some idea 
about ES providers’ conservation or restoration 
opportunity costs can be very helpful in this 
respect — often more helpful than hard-
fought attempts to undertake full economic 
valuation of the ES fl ows proper. To reward 
basically anybody who ‘delivers an ES’, based 
on a politically attractive fairness principle 
(Rosa, Kandel, and Dimas 2003; van Noordwijk, 
Chandler, and Tomich 2004; Gutman 2003), 
seems unwise. First, current funding levels 
would fall far short of the money required 
for indiscriminate payments. The Costa Rican 
PES, with enrolment applications exceeding 
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available funding by about factor of three, is 
illustrative (Rojas and Aylward 2003). 
Second, being a so-called ‘ES provider’ often 
just means not being an environmental 
vandal. Across-the-board entitlements could 
endorse blackmail by anybody owning a non-
threatened asset, from Scandinavian forest 
owners threatening to cut down their trees 
to receive carbon payments, to remote 
indigenous people threatening to deliberately 
pollute a river to receive watershed payments 
from downstream users. It is crucial that 
the underlying ‘victim pays principle’ in PES 
should not be taken to such absurd extremes. 
On the contrary, payments need to be applied 
strategically in those cases where additionality 
can clearly be demonstrated. Only in this 
manner can users’ willingness to pay over time 
be broadly enhanced. Yet this also means that 
people already living in approximate harmony 
with Nature, without any credible reason to 
endanger ES, nor any external threat, will 
generally not qualify as PES recipients.  
If noble savages, nature lovers and farmers 
involuntarily being environmentally benign 
are not the prime targets of PES, then who 
should be paid? One should pay a critical 
mass of agents that both bear some current 
or projected conservation opportunity costs 
and have credible, site-specific claims. A 
timber company would qualify only if it has a 
concession and profi ts from it. A land squatter 
would require informal but widely respected and 
enforced claims on the land, and the prospect 
of privately benefiting from its extensive 
exploitation. ES buyers should not necessarily 
refrain from contracts with informal tenants 
as long as they can demonstrably deny access 
to third parties. Buyers may also use ‘carrots’ 
on top of existing legal ‘paper sticks’ that 
have proved ineffective, unless this glaringly 
leads to perverse incentives. These targeting 
options will be superior in private, localized 
PES schemes, as opposed to the state-run PES 
systems where fl exibility and additionality will 
typically be lower. 
Payment modes should be negotiated in 
advance with PES recipients, leading to a 
choice of cash, in-kind or technical assistance 
— or customized combinations of these. De 
facto irreversible benefi ts, like tenure-security 
provision, may eventually be a precondition 
for PES establishment, but they would not be 
effective incentives providing ES. Likewise, 
schemes biased towards large up-front benefi ts, 
whether cash or in-kind, are not compatible 
with long-run, continuous service provision, 
and should generally be avoided. The choice 
of payment modes should consider whether 
the opportunity costs are in cash or forgone in-
kind benefi ts. Mimicking regular income fl ows 
with small but frequent payments will often be 
socio-economically rational.          
Will PES become a motor for poverty alleviation? 
The existing comparative assessments (Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002; Rosa et al. 2003; Pagiola 
et al. 2005; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005) seem to 
conclude that: 
• net positive effects for ES sellers are 
likely. Gains include non-income benefi ts, 
often in particular for moderately poor 
smallholders; 
• some access rules and structural constraints 
hamper participation by the poor, while 
others are in their favor;
• PES has mixed effects on impoverished 
non-sellers, but the landless poor engaged 
in environmentally degrading activities 
could lose out signifi cantly; 
• the small scale of PES application generally 
also constraints poverty alleviation.
Perhaps the main take-home lesson is that if 
PES does not deliver the service, buyers will not 
continue to support it, and thus PES will also not 
benefi t the poor. Well-meant targeting efforts 
should be careful not to jeopardize the basic 
functionality of PES. Poverty alleviation is an 
important side objective, which can be pursued 
through timely interventions (targeting, 
transaction-cost reduction, pro-poor premiums 
and subsidies), but it should never become 
the primary objective. If we impose a lot of 
side objectives on PES (poverty alleviation, 
gender, indigenous people, human rights, and 
other noble causes), PES would become the 
new toy of donors, NGOs, and government 
agencies. At the same time, the outreach to 
the private sector would be much more limited, 
thus losing new fi nancing options. Eventually, 
PES would become ‘old wine in new bottles’, 
subsumed into the generic family of altruistic 
development projects to which they were 
actually meant to be an alternative. 
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